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Abstract: Upon passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005 ("REAL ID"), the federal
government strove to create national standards for state-issued driver licenses and
identification cards, including standards for the information that must be included on
the card, the documentation that must be presented before a card can be issued, and
how the states must share their data. However, the REAL ID Act has since created
lively debate between proponents of stricter national security measures and
advocates for the protection of privacy and civil liberties. The effect of the REAL
ID Act essentially pushes the United States toward a national identification card,
linked through state Departments of Motor Vehicles ("DMV").
Along with privacy concerns stemming from a national identification card, the
REAL ID Act creates a new wrinkle in the voter identification debate. Since the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 ("HAVA") requires states to verify their voter databases
against the state DMV databases to ensure data accuracy and integrity, there is a
serious risk of a national identification card that will be cross-checked with
American voter rolls and election habits. This indirect outcome of the REAL ID Act
contributes to the growing number of privacy problems surrounding the controversial
Act. If national personally identifiable information is warehoused in matching
database as required under HAVA, the possibility for abuse and security breach
grows exponentially. The challenge now facing the federal government is to balance
national security, the public outcry for protection of civil liberties, and the
installation of technological safeguards to ensure data integrity and security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
American voter turnout is "embarrassingly low" compared to other
democracies. 1  According to public interest groups that research
comparative voter turnout, the United States ranks twentieth out of
twenty-one established democracies in voter turnout; only Switzerland
has lower voter participation than the U.S. turnout for presidential
elections.2 While institutional and cultural factors contribute to poor
voter turnout in the United States, new advances in technology, such
as electronic voting, may promote greater interest and easier
participation in American elections.
The adoption of electronic voting machines was intended to make
voting easier and more secure than previous methods; however, with
the adoption of new technology comes new concerns. The security of
voter data, the protection of voter identification, the accuracy of the
final vote count, and the ability to use the machines to "recount" or
determine voter intent are at the forefront of the voter identification
debate.
With American voter turnout promising to remain lackluster,
confidence in the voting system is a critical factor in encouraging
voters to return to the polls. Skepticism surrounding the integrity of
electronic voting machines used during the election cycle of 2006 has
resulted in a potential new barrier to voting access in America:
mandatory voter identification cards. Since the passage of the REAL
ID Act of 2005 ("REAL ID"), a growing number of states have
enacted legislation that requires voters to present proof of
identification before they can cast their ballots. Voter identification
requirements continue to highlight the ongoing struggle between
attempts to increase access to the voting process and attempts to
protect the integrity of the electoral system as a whole.
REAL ID faces strenuous objections from the American privacy
community, and is part of a broader set of legal issues about how
privacy, voting, and identification will proceed in the wake of both
REAL ID and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ("HAVA"). To
understand REAL ID's impact on the American voting system and
overall democratic process, it is necessary to survey the various
privacy implications surrounding REAL ID as applied to new voting
requirements. REAL ID pushes the nation one step closer to a national
1. FairVote: Voting and Democracy Research Center, Voter Turnout, http://www.fairvote.org/
?page=262 (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
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identification card that requires personal information to be stored in a
central database. The probability that a data breach involving this
central voter database will occur must be weighed against the
important and worthy goal of securing the American voting process.
Passage of REAL ID and the rise of voter identification requirements
compel us to consider at what point the need to protect the privacy of
voter data outweighs the siren song of promoting national security.
This note first discusses recent developments and ongoing
controversies concerning the REAL ID Act of 2005. The note then
explores the ramifications of a national identification card on the
recent state trend of requiring identification at the polls.
II. THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005
On May 11, 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act as part of the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief Act.3 The goal of REAL ID is to
create national standards for state-issued driver licenses and
identification cards, including standards for the information that must
be included on the card, the documentation that must be presented
before a card can be issued, and how the states must share their data.
4
These standards must be met by May 11, 2008, for the state-issued
documents to be accepted as valid identification by the federal
government.
REAL ID shifts the authority for determining the content and
qualification for an identification card from the state to the federal
government. Currently, each state determines for itself the data to be
collected, the acceptable documentation, and the method of data
storage. On May 11, 2008, when REAL ID takes effect, federal
agencies will no longer accept any state identification card that does
not meet certain federal requirements, as set forth in the Act.5 States
will remain free to issue non-complying licenses and identification
cards, provided that the cards have a unique design and an explicit
3 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109_cong-public-laws&docid=
f:publ013.109.pdf.
4 See id. For additional information, see Wikipedia, REAL ID Act,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/REALIDAct (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
5 "A Federal agency may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver's license or
identification card issued by a State to any person unless the State is meeting the
requirements." REAL ID Act § 202(a)(1).
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statement that they cannot be accepted for any federal identification
purpose. Though federal justifications for requiring uniform
identification for all Americans are grounded in national security,
REAL ID will have a major impact on the daily life of Americans. For
example, the Federal Transportation Security Administration ("TSA")
is responsible for security check-in at airports, so travelers without a
national ID card would not be allowed to board commercial aircraft.
The REAL ID Act of 2005 has created lively debate between
proponents of stricter national security measures and advocates for the
protection of privacy and civil liberties. Supporters of REAL ID,
namely former U.S. House Judiciary Chairman James Sensenbrenner
(R-WI), claim it is a necessary tool in the ongoing war against
terrorism. 6 Conversely, those who disfavor REAL ID claim it burdens
state governments and infringes upon personal privacy. According to
the National Governors Association ("NGA"), the standards required
by REAL ID are likely to alter long-standing state laws, regulations,
and practices governing the qualifications for and the production and
issuance of driver licenses and identification cards in every state.
Also, the NGA claims that the standards require substantial financial
investments by states and the federal government to meet the
objectives of the Act.7
A. THE HISTORY OF NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS
Americans have consistently rejected the idea of a national ID
card. When the Social Security number ("SSN") was created in 1936,
it was meant to be used only as an account number associated with the
administration of the Social Security system.8 Although the SSN's
uses have expanded considerably, it is still not a universal identifier,
and efforts to make it one have been consistently rejected. In 1971 the
Social Security Administration task force on the SSN rejected a
6 Press Release, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, House Gives Final Approval to REAL ID
Legislation (May 5, 2005), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/REALIDHousefinalpass505 .pdf.
7 NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N ET AL., THE REAL ID ACT: NATIONAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 2 (Sept.
2006), available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0609REALID.pdf.
8 "The Social Security Act (P.L. 74-271) is enacted. It did not expressly mention the use of
SSNs, but it authorized the creation of some type of record keeping scheme." See Social
Security Online, Social Security Numbers: Social Security Number Chronology,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/ssnchron.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
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proposal to turn it into an ID. 9 In 1973, the Health, Education and
Welfare Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data
Systems concluded that a national identifier was not desirable.'°
In 1976, the Federal Advisory Committee on False Identification
rejected the idea of a national identifier for American citizens.11 In
1977, the Carter administration reiterated that the SSN was not to
become an identifier, and in 1981 the Reagan administration stated
that it was "explicitly opposed" to the creation of a national ID card.
12
The Clinton administration advocated a "Health Security Card" in
1993 and assured the public that such a card, issued to ever
American, would enjoy full privacy and confidentiality protection;
however, the idea was rejected and the health security card was never
created. Most recently, in 1999, Congress repealed a controversial
provision in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 that would have granted authorization to
include Social Security numbers on driver licenses. 14
Despite the numerous rejections, there was renewed interest in the
creation of national ID cards following the events of September 11,
2001. In response to the terrorist attacks, and out of concern for the
safety of American citizens, congressional hearings were held to
91d.
10 DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS § VIII (July
1973), available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm.
This report is commonly known as the "HEW Report." In 1973, the Health, Education and
Welfare Secretary's Advisory Committee [now known as the Department of Health and
Human Services] on Automated Personal Data Systems rejected the creation of a national
identifier and advocated the establishment of significant safeguards to protect personal
information. The committee said: "We recommend against the adoption of any nationwide,
standard, personal identification format, with or without the SSN, that would enhance the
likelihood of arbitrary or uncontrolled linkage of records about people, particularly between
government or government-supported automated personal data systems. What is needed is a
halt to the drift toward [a standard universal identifier] and prompt action to establish
safeguards providing legal sanctions against abuses of automated personal data systems." Id.
1l Id.
12 Robert B. Cullen, Administration Announcing Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 30, 1981.
13 Robert Pear, Clinton Medical Plan Calls For 'Health Security' Cards, N.Y. TIMES, April 10,
1993, http://query.nytimes.con/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9FOCEI D7153EF933A25757COA965958260.
14 Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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discuss the value of creating national identification cards. To help
streamline the promotion of national security, Congress created the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), but stated explicitly in the
enabling legislation that the agency did not have the authority to create
a national ID system.15
In September 2004, then-DHS Secretary Tom Ridge reiterated,
"[t]he legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security
was very specific on the question of a national ID card. They said
there will be no national ID card.",16 This sentiment was short-lived,
however, for at the urging of Rep. Sensenbrenner, and with the help of
some procedural "trickery,"' 17 Congress passed the REAL ID Act of
2005, which mandates federal requirements for driver licenses. Critics
responded to the passage by calling it a national identification card.
B. THE REAL ID ACT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Supporters of the REAL ID Act, including Rep. Sensenbrenner,
claim that the overarching goal of the Act is to increase the safety of
American citizens,18 and believe that the Act is necessary to hinder
terrorist activities by implementing the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission. Along with standardizing state driver licenses, REAL
ID requires that foreign visitors be issued temporary licenses that will
expire when their visa expires, with a maximum term of one year.19
15 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
16 Tom Ridge, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., Remarks at the Transatlantic Homeland Security
Conference at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University (Sept. 13,
2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0206.shtm.
17See US. Senate Should Vote Against 'REAL ID' Because it's a Bad Proposal, THE NASHUA
TELEGRAPH, April 15, 2005. "[O]nly procedural tricks explain how the House passed this
measure so quickly and why the Senate is poised to pass it. The 'trick' here was attaching it to
a 'must-pass' bill-the supplemental appropriations bill that sends money to troops in Iraq and
provides financial relief for tsunami victims. By use of this tactic, proponents are hoping to
avoid scrutiny and gain politically by mischaracterizing it as a measure that will enhance our
security or control immigration." Id.
18 Press Release, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 6. The REAL ID Act provisions will
"hamper the ability of terrorist and criminal aliens to move freely throughout society by
requiring that all states require proof of lawful presence in the U.S. for their drivers' licenses
to be accepted as identification for federal purposes such as boarding a commercial airplane,
entering a federal building, or a nuclear power plant." Id.
9 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), available at
http://fi-webgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 09_congpublic-laws&docid=
f:publ013.109.pdf.
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The Act also contains provisions that will prevent potentially
dangerous aliens from entering the United States under false pretenses
in order to gain safe haven, while simultaneously protecting those who
are legitimately fleeing persecution.
20
Proponents of REAL ID argue that by adopting the Act, Congress
is simply implementing the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission.2' These proponents claim that the Act was created in
response to recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission in an
effort to make it more difficult for terrorists and undocumented
immigrants to obtain legitimate identification documents and to travel
freely around the country.2
2
The Act also attempts to make it difficult for identification
documents to be forged and used for criminal purposes. 23  The
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission include "standards for the
issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as
drivers' licenses. 24 In our post-9/1 1 society, identification fraud is no
longer just a problem of theft. According to the Commission report, at
many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding
aircraft, identification verification is "the last opportunity to ensure
that people are who they say they are and to check whether they are
terrorists. ' 25
III. CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUES OF THE REAL ID ACT
Despite its purported security benefits, REAL ID has generated
significant opposition from diverse entities, ranging from privacy
professionals to elected state government officials. First, immigration
proponents argue that REAL ID does not enhance national security.26
20 id.
21 Press Release, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 6.
22 Id.
23 Kim Zetter, No Real Debate for REAL ID, WIRED NEWS, May 10, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1848,67471 ,00.html?tw=wn_topheadl.
2 4 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 390
(2004), available at http://www.9-11 commission.gov/report/91 1Report.pdf.
"Recommendation: Secure identification should begin in the United States." Id.
25 Id.
26 The National Council of La Raza, Policies, REAL ID Act, http://www.nclr.org/content/
policy/detail/29762/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
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Second, state officials argue against REAL ID on the grounds that it is
overly burdensome to state departments of motor vehicles and is
astronomically expensive to implement, making it essentially a federal
"unfunded mandate."2 7  Third, significant technological issues arise
from REAL ID, especially regarding which database system must be
used.28 Finally, there is substantial concern over privacy issues,
including the possibility of database breaches and the placement of
tracking technology in every citizen's identification card.
A. LACK OF REAL BENEFITS TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Advocates of a more open immigration system are especially
concerned about REAL ID. The focus of many immigration advocacy
groups is to build support for public policies that are fair and
supportive to immigrants and refugees entering the United States.
29
These groups feel that the Act will prevent people fleeing persecution
from obtaining relief, deny immigrants their day in court when the
government makes a mistake, and actually undermine American
security more than it would help.
30
In response to the argument that REAL ID is necessary for national
security, immigration and privacy proponents claim that it will actually
27 Press Release, Senator Lamar Alexander, Alexander Criticizes 'REAL ID' as Unfunded
Mandate: Urges Senate to Delay Implementation, Create and Pay for National ID (February
15, 2007), available at http://alexander.senate.gov/index.cfln?FuseAction=
PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease id= l03&Month=2&Year=2007. Press release stating
that U.S. Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) called on his colleagues to delay the
implementation of the 2005 REAL ID Act, which "turned 190 million driver's licenses into
national identification cards, with state taxpayers paying most of the cost." "I said to my
colleagues at [the] time that this is one more of the unfunded federal mandates that we
Republicans promised to end," Alexander said. "One of the reasons so many states are asking
us to overturn REAL ID is that, according to the National Governors' Association,
implementing the law will cost more than $11 billion to implement, and we have provided
only $40 million." Alexander added that he has 'reluctantly' concluded that America needs a
national ID card, but said "REAL ID isn't the way to do it. DMV employees aren't ready to
be turned into CIA agents to check for terrorists. "Nothing used to make me madder when I
was Governor of Tennessee than for some group of Congressmen to come up with a big idea,
turn it into law, hold a big press conference, take credit for it, and send the bill to the States to
pay for it," he said.
28 Anush Yegyazarian, Tech.gov: REAL ID's Real Problems, PC WORLD, Oct. 11, 2006,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id, 127419-c,techrelatedlegislation/article.html.
29 The National Council of La Raza: Policies, supra note 26.
30 THE NASHUA TELEGRAPH, supra note 17.
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hinder the American security process.3 By setting federal eligibility
requirements for driver licenses, REAL ID will undermine national
security by pushing immigrants deeper into the shadows and forcing
many to drive without licenses. Thus, this bill limits, rather than
expands, government data about individuals in this country.
Many privacy advocates also argue that REAL ID does little to
improve national security. Privacy proponent Jim Harper argues that a
national ID represents a transfer of power from individuals to
institutions, and that such a transfer threatens liberty, enables identity
fraud, and subjects people to unwanted surveillance. 32 Instead of a
uniform, government-controlled identification system, Harper calls for
a competitive, responsive identification and credentialing industry that
meets the mix of consumer demands for privacy, security, anonymity,
and accountability. 33 Identification should be a risk-reducing strategy
in a social system, Harper concludes not a rivet to pin humans to
governmental or economic machinery.Y
4
B. THE HIGH COSTS OF IMPLEMENTATION
In response to the REAL ID Act, the American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators ("AAMVA"), 35 the National Governors
Association ("NGA") 36 and the National Conference of State
Legislatures ("NCSL")37 conducted a nationwide survey of state motor
vehicle agencies ("DMVs"). This comprehensive document, "The
REAL ID Act: National Impact Analysis," outlined the many ways in
which states have been left to foot the bill for REAL ID-compliant
identification cards. According to the NCSL report, which has
enjoyed wide citation since publication, the REAL ID Act will cost
3 1id
32 Jim HARPER, IDENTITY CRISIS: How IDENTIFICATION IS OVERUSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD
(2006).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, http://www.aamva.org (last
visited Jan. 26, 2008).
36 See National Governors Association, http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga (last visited Jan. 26,
2008).
37 See National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org (last visited Jan. 26,
2008).
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more than $11 billion to implement.38 One-time upfront costs are
estimated to approach $1 billion, while total ongoing costs are
expected to be more than $10.1 billion over the first five-year period.39
These ongoing costs can be categorized as re-enrollment, new
verification processes, design requirements, and support costs.
First, to implement REAL ID, all 245 million U.S. identification
holders must be re-credentialed within five years of the May 2008
compliance deadline.40 This standard requires an in-person visit by
every current identification holder, as well as new applicants, to
review and verify all required identification documents and to re-
document information for the new license, including the principal
residence, a new photograph, and a new signature.41 Efficiencies from
alternative renewal processes such as the Internet and mail will be lost
during the re-enrollment period, and states will face increased costs
from the need to hire more employees and expand business hours to
meet the five-year re-enrollment deadline. This "re-enrollment" cost
to the states has been estimated at approximately $8.48 billion.42
Second, since REAL ID supplants traditional DMV vetting
processes by requiring states to independently verify each
identification document with its issuing agency, new verification
processes must be created.43 While the Act contemplates the use of
five national electronic systems to facilitate verification, only one of
these systems is currently available on a nationwide basis. System
development, programming, testing, and training will take
considerable time and investment that far exceed the deadlines or
funds provided by the Act or Congress. Developing these new
verification processes has an estimated price tag of $1.42 billion.44
Third, the Act calls for states to incorporate new security features
into identification cards to prevent tampering and counterfeiting.
Although most states have already incorporated some security features
38 NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
39 1d. at3.
40 Id.
41 id.
42 Id. at 6.
431 d. at9.
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into their card designs, the contemplated regulations will likely
mandate the use of a single security configuration that will maximize
costs by minimizing state flexibility in card design and production.
Depending on the technology chosen, such a requirement could dictate
DMV business practices by effectively requiring DMVs to move away
from over-the-counter issuance systems and towards central issuance
systems. Since it also seems likely that the states will have to overhaul
the design of their identification cards, these new design requirements
will cost an estimated $1.11 billion.45
Finally, the REAL ID Act contains several other requirements that
will affect state business practices and budgets, including mandatory
security clearances for all employees involved in the production and
issuance of ID cards, and mandatory fraudulent document recognition
training. These support costs are estimated to be $400 million.4 6
At the conclusion of their findings, the NCSL reported that in
addition to the higher costs that will be passed on to drivers, the REAL
ID Act will reduce DMV efficiency and increase waiting times for
card applicants. 47  To comply with the requirement that all
identification card holders re-verify their identity with the state, DMV
employees must review all of the applicant's identification documents,
which may significantly increase the time spent processing a request
for an ID card by both the DMV employee and the applicant. In
addition, the Act will effectively reverse state practices designed to
ease an applicant's interaction with motor vehicle agencies, e.g.,
through the use of Internet, mail-in renewal, and over-the-counter
issuance. Following their sweeping cost analysis of REAL ID, the
NCSL later approved a resolution demanding Congress pay for
implementation or repeal the Act by 2007.
C. TECHNOLOGICAL DISPARITIES
The report from the NCSL, mentioned above, raises another major
issue with the REAL ID Act, namely the lack of guidance concerning
allowable technologies. The issue centers on whether all states should
be required to use the same machine-readable technology for their IDs.
Many states favor allowing states to decide for themselves which
technology to implement. They argue that allowing the use of multiple
451d. at 16.
41Id. at 17.
47 Id. at 3.
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technologies provides opportunities for potential cost savings, for
leveraging technological advances and for hampering the efforts of
criminals trying to access the data.as
However, the use of multiple technologies is in direct conflict with
the goals of the legislation. The purpose of REAL ID is to produce
documents that can be read and used by agencies throughout the
United States. Without a common technology, every entity that needs
to read ID cards, including federal agencies and banks, would need to
maintain readers compatible with all the card technologies currently or
previously in use. To understand the scope and nature of the potential
conflicts inherent in multiple state systems, imagine an airline
passenger trying to get home from an out-of-state flight being forced
to wait while security staffers find a reader that will read his or her ID
card;49 Or an applicant for a job in a new state being told he or she
must obtain an ID from the new state because the prospective
employer cannot read and verify the information from the former
state's REAL ID-compliant card; 0 Or a new state resident being
unable to open a bank account in the new state because his or her
identification was not compatible with the bank's reader. 51 These
logistical problems present just a few of the potential conflicts that
may stem from the federal refusal to recognize noncompliant state
identification cards.
D. POTENTIAL PRIVACY VIOLATIONS
One REAL ID privacy concern stems from embedding Radio
Frequency Identification ("RFID") tags in new government-issued
identification cards. Contact-less integrated circuits, most commonly
in the form of RFID tags, are tiny devices connected to miniature
antennae. "When a circuit reader emits a radio signal, the devices in
the vicinity respond by transmitting their stored information to the
reader. 5 2  When the devices contain and transmit encoded personal
48 Yegyazarian, supra note 28.
49 id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Fact Sheet: Senate Bill 768, The Identity Information
Protection Act of 2006: Safeguarding the Privacy, Safety, and Financial Security of
Californians, http://www.eff.org/Privacy/RFID/sb768-fact-sheet.php (last visited Jan. 26,
2008).
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information, they do not alert the holder that his or her personal
information, such as a birth date, digital picture, or unique
identification number, is being distributed.5 3  Recent U.S. State
Department testing54 showed that even IDs with an intended read
range of just four inches can actually be read from two to three feet
away with modified readers.
55
RFIDs, which comply with REAL ID's "machine-readable
technology" requirement,n along with the possibility of other
Homeland Security add-ons, raise the most serious risk that REAL ID
will cause privacy violations. 57 The risks posed by machine-readable
technology are magnified by the Act's requirement that the technology
must be "common," which raises the already-high risk of identity
theft.58 Many commentators predict that RFID tags will be placed in
our driver licenses, and have expressed concern over lack of notice to
the user.59 In the past, the Department of Homeland Security has
53 id.
54 id.
55 See William A. Herbert, No Direction Home: Will The Law Keep Pace With Human
Tracking Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?, 2 ISJLP 409 (2006)
(additional information regarding RFIDs and the State Department's new developments in
"human tracking").
56 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(b)(9), 119 Stat. 231, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l 09_cong_public laws&docid=
f:publO13.109.pdf.
57 Anita Ramasastry, Why the 'REAL ID'Act is a Real Mess, CNN.COM, Aug. 12, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/08/12/ramasastry.ids/index.html.
58 REAL ID Act § 202(b)(9). The Act mandates "a common machine-readable technology,"
such as a bar code, magnetic stripe, or Radio Frequency Identification ("RFID") chip, to
contain in an electronic format the same information printed on the front of the license (and
possibly additional information) in order to allow computerized scanning of the licenses by a
standard reader. Most states believe they are compliant based on the assumption that any
machine-readable element is acceptable. Discussions with DHS indicate that this assumption
is in error. DHS believes that "common" technology means common to all states and,
presumably, interoperable between states and the federal government. Adopting this
interpretation will result in substantial financial impacts to almost every state, impacts almost
certain to be even greater than those stemming from fulfilling the legal name requirement
discussed above. For more information, see CHRISTOPHER CALABRESE, REAL COSTS:
ASSESSING THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE REAL ID ACT ON THE STATES 9 available at
http://www.realnightmare.org/images/File/Outline%20of%/2OReal%20ID%2OCosts.pdf (last
visited Jan. 26, 2008).
59 Ramasastry, supra note 57.
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indicated its interest in RFID chips.60  Significantly, those signals
would allow the government to track the movement of identification
cards, thus tracking every movement of anyone carrying an
identification card. Private businesses may also be able to use remote
scanners to read customers' or employees' RFID tags and add
information to the digital dossiers they may already be compiling.61
E. ANTI-REAL ID STATE LEGISLATION
At the time of this writing, six states have enacted statutory bans
on REAL ID implementation; another ten states have adopted
resolutions opposing the implementation of REAL ID in their states.
The anti-REAL ID momentum began in California with an
unsuccessful attempt by the state government to ban the use of RFID
tags in its state identification cards. 62  The second, from New
60 Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Radio Frequency Identification Technology,
Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pressrelease_0715.shtm (indicating that
DHS plans to apply RFID technology to its US-VISIT program. "US-VISIT is exploring the
use of RFID technology as a tool that will better enable the program to fulfill its goals, which
are to enhance the security of our citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade to
and from the United States, ensure the integrity of our immigration system, and protect the
privacy of our visitors. RFID technology has the potential to improve the ability to match
entries to exits without impacting processing time at the land border ports, and to record
arrivals and departures of visitors in pedestrian and vehicle lanes rapidly, accurately and
reliably. It will also allow US-VISIT to detect a visitor's tag and provide the primary
inspection process with information and a mechanism for establishing an accurate and timely
record of exits without slowing a traveler through the process. Finally, RFID can provide
solutions that are not invasive and that protect the privacy of visitors.").
61 Ramasastry, supra note 57.
62 In response to pending RFID implementation, the California legislature in August 2006
passed the Identity Information Protection Act of 2006. See Information Protection Act of
2006, 2006 Cal. Stat. 768. This bill was an attempt to mitigate growing technology concerns
surrounding RFID, one of the technologies (discussed above) in strong contention for use in
the REAL ID cards (and also set to be used in e-passports). Sponsored and supported by a
variety of consumer advocacy groups, the bill laid out security standards for any state RFID-
equipped card. See Yegyazarian, supra note 28. The mandated safeguards included making
the cards tamper-resistant, encrypting the data, and requiring authentication of both the card
and reader so that authorities could be sure a card was genuine and cardholders could be sure
unauthorized people were not reading their information. The bill also required mechanisms
that let cardholders control the wireless transmission of their ID's information in order to
prevent tech-savvy snoops from tracking cardholders or gaining access to card information
being broadcast. Another provision stated that cardholders had to be informed about how the
issuing agency intended to use it, what information was being collected and stored when the
card was read, what the basic risks of the technology were, and which precautions were
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Hampshire was an unsuccessful attempt to opt-out of REAL ID
altogether.63  In early 2007, Maine became the first state to
successfully reject REAL ID, followed by Idaho. Throughout the
following months, states have continued to either opt out of REAL ID
completely, or pass resolutions calling on Congress to repeal the law.
As mentioned above, following the attempt by New Hampshire to
"live free or die," both Idaho and Maine have refused to participate in
the REAL ID Act, regardless of the possible ramifications for their
citizens. In Maine, the legislature overwhelmingly rejected federal
requirements for national identification cards in January 2007,
marking the first formal state opposition to the controversial
legislation.64  Both chambers of the Maine legislature approved a
resolution saying the state flatly "refuses" to force its citizens to use
driver licenses that comply with digital ID standards that were
established under the 2005 REAL ID Act. Maine also asked the U.S.
Congress to repeal the law.65 In Idaho, the legislature passed House
Joint Memorial 3,66 which states, in part, that Idaho, "shall enact no
legislation nor authorize an appropriation to implement the provisions
of the REAL ID Act in Idaho, unless such appropriation is used
available to keep the card from being read remotely (either with or without the holder's
knowledge).
63 In April 2006, the New Hampshire House passed H.B. 1582, proclaiming the state's refusal
to participate in the REAL ID program, which would have made New Hampshire the first state
to openly reject REAL ID. See H.B. 1582 (N.H. 2006), available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2006/hb1582.html. The New Hampshire Senate
voted down the bill, in part because New Hampshire was one of the first states to be offered
federal funding to help alleviate state costs of the program. The lawmakers behind the New
Hampshire proposal argued that the federal law would effectively establish a national ID
system that threatens civil liberties. See Michael Martinez, New Hampshire May Buck Feds
Over National IDs, GOV'T EXEC. MAG., April 13, 2006, http://www.govexec.com/
story_page.cfi?articleid=33842&dcn=todaysnews. They also voiced concerns that the law is
an unfunded mandate that places an unfair financial burden on the states. Id. Others lawmakers
worry about the consequences of rejecting the federal statute. Several lawmakers have voiced
concern that state residents would be forced to use passports to board domestic airplane flights
if REAL ID is rejected. Id.
64 2007 Me. Acts SP 113, Maine's Resolution Against the Real ID Act of 2005 (enacted Jan.
25, 2007), available at http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/DLs/state real id-proposals 2007-04-
23.pdf. Maine continued to voice its disapproval of the REAL ID Act by passing LD 1138, an
act to prohibit Maine from participating in a national identification system, on June 5, 2007.
65 Declan McCullagh, Maine Rejects REAL ID Act, CNET NEws.COM, Jan. 25, 2007,
http://news.com.com/2100-7348_3-6153532.html.
66 Idaho Session Laws HJM3 (2007), available at http://www3.state.id.us/oasis/2007/
HJM003.html.
2007-08]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
exclusively for the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive analysis
of the costs of implementing the REAL ID Act or to mount a
constitutional challenge to the Act by the state Attorney General.,
67
Following the lead of these two states, there is developing a
growing rebellion in the states against REAL ID. As of September 30,
2007, similar legislation rejecting REAL ID had been enacted in
Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, Colorado,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Missouri, Arkansas, Illinois, Tennessee,
Georgia, South Carolina, New Hampshire and Maine;68 bills rejecting
REAL ID have passed one chamber of the state legislature in Oregon,
Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, Minnesota, Louisiana, West
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Vermont69; and bills rejecting REAL ID
have been formally introduced in Texas, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio,
Kentucky, New York, Maryland, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
Massachusetts. 70 While citizen backlash is still a concern, 71 there is a
clear trend among states to instead opt for the protection of their
citizens' privacy.
VI. THE EFFECTS OF A NATIONAL ID ON VOTING RIGHTS
The Help America Vote Act ("HAVA") was passed in 2002 in
response to the election administration issues of the 2000 presidential
election. HAVA defined minimum election administration standards
that all states must follow, notably in the areas of voter identification
and database management. Among the most significant changes
driven by HAVA are the new rules governing the kind of identification
voters must bring with them when they go to the polls. This issue was
controversial in the 2004 election because of its impact on the newly
adopted provisional ballots. "It also touches on the contentious topic
67 Idaho Second State to Reject REAL ID Act, NORTH COUNTRY GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 2007,
http://www.northcountrygazette.org/articles/2007/0309071dahoRejects.html.
68 Real Nightmare, Status of Anti-REAL ID Legislation in the States,
http://www.realnightmare.org/news/105/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
69 id.
70 Id.
71 If a state opts out of REAL ID, there is a significant worry that its citizens will be denied
federal benefits.
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of immigration, particularly in states like Arizona and Georgia, which
have large immigrant populations.
'
"
72
Title III, Section 303 of HAVA mandates that voters must present
identification at a polling place the first time they vote in a jurisdiction
if they registered through the mail and failed to include a copy of their
license, utility bill, bank statement, government check, or other
government document displaying name and address, or otherwise
failed to provide the last four digits of their Social Security or their
driver license number.73  Any such voter who fails to present
identification at the polling place is entitled to a provisional ballot,
which will be counted if the voter is later determined to be eligible
under state law. Based on all of the indicators, it appears that the
number of states requiring identification from all voters regardless of
the qualifications included in Section 303, is on the rise.T
4
As in previous years, the debate in state legislatures regarding this
issue has been partisan and divisive. Much of the emphasis on ballot
security and fraud reduction has centered on proposals to introduce or
change requirements for voter identification at the polling place.
However, election officials in many states have said that absentee
ballots and early voting, which are delivered through the mail, provide
the easiest opportunity to undermine the election process and commit
fraud on a scale capable of affecting the result in a close election.
75
At the time of this writing, the current status of voter identification
requirements indicates that twenty-four states have broader voter
identification requirements than mandated by HAVA. In these states,
all voters are asked to show identification prior to voting.76 Seven
states specify that voters must show a photo ID; the other seventeen
accept additional forms of identification that do not necessarily include
a photo. The states that require photo identification are Florida,
72 MELISSA RIESS ET AL., VOTING IN 2006: HAVE WE SOLVED THE PROBLEMS OF 2004? 23 (Oct.
12, 2006) available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/electionreform/votingin2006.pdf.
73 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1712-13 (2002)
available at http://www.fec.gov/hava/lawext.txt.
74 THE CENTURY FOUND., BALANCING ACCESS AND INTEGRITY, THE REPORT OF THE CENTURY
FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ELECTION REFORM 14 (2005)
available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/ElectionReformlbaicomplete.pdf.
75 id.
76 NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTER IDENTIFICATION, (Jan. 9,
2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/taskfc/voteridreq.htm.
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Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, and South Dakota."
States that accept non-photograph forms of identification are Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. 78 All states
have a recourse provision that allows voters who present no
identification to cast a vote, usually through the use of a provisional
ballot.7
9
A. VOTER ID LITIGATION UPDATE
Many states, including Arizona, Georgia, Missouri, and Ohio, have
passed new, more stringent voter identification requirements,
purportedly as a way of preventing voter fraud by ensuring that only
citizens who are eligible to vote actually do so. There is little proof,
however, that voter fraud is a significant problem, particularly fraud
due to voter impersonation at the polls, which is the only kind of fraud
an identification requirement would address. Instead, these
identification requirements have the effect of disenfranchising many
eligible voters who, for a variety of reasons, are unable to produce the
proper identification. 8 Even among voters who have the necessary
identification, critics argue that such requirements increase the
likelihood of racial and ethnic discrimination.8 1  The following
sections provide a survey of current state voter identification
legislation and litigation.
1. ARIZONA
In 2004, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200, which was
aimed at restricting illegal immigrants' access to public benefits.
8 2
Under Proposition 200, voters are required to present proof of
77 Id.
78 id.
79 Id.
80 THE CENTURY FouND., supra note 74, at 23.
81 id.
82 STATE OF ARIZONA, ARIZONA 2004 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS: PROPOSITION 200, available at
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2004/info/PubPamphlet/english/prop200.pdf (last visited Jan.
26, 2008).
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citizenship when they register to vote, and must show some form of
government-issued photo identification or two approved non-photo
identifications when they go to the polls.83  Proposition 200 also
requires voters to present a driver license that was issued after October
1, 1996 or some other proof of citizenship when registering. 84 The
voter registration form will be reiected if a driver license issued before
October 1, 1996, is presented. Since this regulation was enacted,
large numbers of voter registration forms-up to 72 percent in some
counties-have been rejected.86  In response, a number of
organizations have sued the state, claiming the voting provisions of
Proposition 200 are unconstitutional and violate the Voting Rights Act
and the National Voter Registration Act.
87
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
blocked Proposition 200 from being used in the _general election,
which the state appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On October 20,
2006, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court injunction that
barred the state from implementing new rules requiring voters to show
ID at the polls in the November 7, 2006, general election.89 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruling on part of Proposition 200 merely allowed the
November 7 election to proceed with the identification requirements in
place. 90 Federal courts will still have to resolve a lawsuit contending
that the law will disenfranchise voters, particularly the elderly and
minorities.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 id.
86 THE CENTURY FOUND., supra note 74, at 11.
87 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Arizona, Nos. 06A375 (06-532) and 06A379 (06-533) (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated sub nom. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 U.S. 5 (2006).
88 Id.
89 Paul Davenport, Voter ID Back in Force: Supreme Court Allows Arizona to Require ID in
November Elections, MOHAVE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 21, 2006,
http://www.mohavedailynews.com/articles/2006/10/22/news/localocal 1.txt.
90 Gonzalez, 127 U.S. 5.
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2. GEORGIA
Georgia was among the first states to tighten its voter identification
requirements. In March 2005, after contentious debate, the state
legislature passed House Bill 244, which required voters to present a
photo ID--driver license, state ID, Fassport, military ID or tribal ID-
in order to vote a traditional ballot. 1 If the voter does not have photo
ID, the law allows the voter to use a provisional ballot and then present
a photo ID to the elections office within forty-eight hours.92 The new
law was challenged in court and a preliminary injunction was
granted. 93
The Georgia legislature, working closely with Governor Sonny
Perdue, passed a similar law (S.B. 84) in January 2006 that includes
provisions to simplify access to photo ID for elderly, poor, and
minority voters. 94 In September 2006, a state court declared the law
unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement.95
Although the state announced its intention to appeal the ruling, the law
was not in effect for the November 2006 election.96  Following the
November 2006 election cycle, this issue was elevated to the Georgia
Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court ruling, agreeing that the
Georgia Photo ID law was unconstitutional.97
91 H.R. 244, 119th Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2006), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/
legis/2005_06/pd f/hb244.pdf.
92 Id.
93 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, no. 4:05-cv-00201-HLM (N. D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2005)
(order granting preliminary injunction) available at http://www.votingrights.org/news/
downloads/Georgia%20Photo%201D%20Injunction.pdf.
94 GA. CODE ANN. §21-2-417 ("The 2006 Photo ID Act").
95 Lake v. Perdue, No. S06M1856 (Ga. 2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/litigation/Lake.php.
96 Id.
97 Lake v. Perdue, No. S07A0525 (Ga. 2007), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/litigation/documents/decision000.pdf See also Nathan Cemenska, Georgia High
Court Throws Out Voter ID Case, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, June 11, 2007,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/news/articles.php?ID--155. "Today the Georgia Supreme
Court reversed a state trial court's holding that the Georgia voter ID law violates the state
constitution. The court did not reach the merits of the case, but instead based its decision on a
lack of standing. Because the plaintiff, Rosalind Lake, was voting in Georgia for the first time
and registered by mail, the court determined under a state statute that she did not have to
present photo ID, but only the HAVA-type ID required of first-time mail-in registrants. For
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Meanwhile, the policies implemented by the state to simplify
access to photo ID have come under attack. According to a study
conducted by the Secretary of State that compared statewide voter
registration databases to Department of Driver Services records,
almost 305,000 voters have not been issued a driver license or any
form of identification card that would satisfy the new ID
requirement. 98  The study states that a disproportionate number of
these 305,000 are minority or elderly voters.
The Elections Board also indicated that the state would rely
heavily on non-profit organizations such as the League of Women
Voters ("LWV") to conduct education and registration campaigns, a
strategy that is undermined considerably by Georgia's and other states'
new laws imposing harsh penalties on third-party groups such as the
LWV, for improper submission of registration forms. °  Georgia
Secretary of State Cathy Cox testified that no cases of polling place
voter fraud have been reported in Georgia in her seven years in office,
and that confusion created by the new laws concerning what ID is
necessar.y to vote makes the state more, rather than less, vulnerable to
fraud.101
3. MISSOURI
In the spring of 2005, Missouri's state legislature also passed a bill
requiring photo identification at the polls 1 2 This bill has been
attacked by the Brennan Center, which published a brief titled
"Analysis of Eligible Voters Potentially Barred from the Polls by
this reason, she had no standing to complain about the photo ID law. The court also
determined that Lake did not have standing because she possessed a form of public
transportation identification that was sufficient to allow voting even under the more stringent
photo ID law."
98 Press Release, Georgia Secretary of State, Analysis of State Databases Reveals Nearly
700,000 Registered voters Lack Valid Driver's License or State-Issued Georgia ID (June 19,
2006).
99 Id.
'
00 THE CENTURY FOUND., supra note 74, at 24.
101 Walter C. Jones, Cox: Law Will Lead to More Fraud at Ballot Box, THE FLORIDA TIMES-
UNION, Oct. 13, 2005, at B-I, available at http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/
101305/geo20016429.shtml.
102 NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 76.
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Restrictive New Identification Requirements in Missouri Senate Bills
Nos. 1014 & 730.,,103 The Brennan Center describes the new ID
requirements as unconstitutional and exclusionary to "hundreds of
thousands of eligible Missouri voters.' 0 4
An estimated 170,000 Missourians lack driver licenses. °5 The
state has announced plans to issue free identification cards to non-
drivers to help them comply with the new identification
requirements. 10 6  However, in order to receive a non-driver
identification card, a voter must prove his or her lawful presence in the
United States by presenting a birth certificate or passport, which can
be cost prohibitive for some potential voters to obtain.1 7 Critics of the
new ID requirements also argue that gettin a non-driver ID is not as
simple as state officials make it out to be.' For example, it can take
as long as six months to obtain a birth certificate if the name on the
record is misspelled or otherwise incorrect. 0 9 In separate lawsuits,
both the state Democratic Party and a group of independent voters
have sued the state regarding the new ID law, claiming that it violates
the state constitution.r° It was declared unconstitutional in September
2006.111 Another lawsuit has been filed in federal court, but was
stayed pending resolution of two prior state cases.12
103 TE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS POTENTIALLY BARRED
FROM THE POLLS BY RESTRICTIVE NEW IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS IN MISSOURI SENATE
BILLS Nos. 1014 & 730, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/
subpages/download file_10172.pdf(last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
105 id.
106 id.
107 id.
108 Id.
110 Weinshenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006).
111 Id.
112 NAACP v. Carnahan, Inc., No. 06-04200-CV-C-SOW (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2006) (dismissed
as moot and without prejudice on Nov. 21, 2006).
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4. OHIO
Ohio passed House Bill 3 in 2006, requiring all Ohio voters to
show identification before casting a ballot, effective June 1, 2006.113
Democrats and activists claim that the bill's identification requirement
was not needed, especially since voter fraud has never been a major
problem in Ohio." Prior to the bill, Ohio voters simply signed their
names at the polling place and the signature was compared to the
signature on file from the voter registration form.11 5  The new law
requires all voters to present one of the approved forms of ID-a valid
photo ID, a military ID, or a copy of a utility bill, bank statement,
government check, paycheck, or other government document other
than a voting reminder or voter registration notification-that shows
the voter's name and current address. 1 6 Voters who do not provide
one of these documents may still vote via a provisional ballot if they
providing the last four digits of their Social Security number or sign an
affirmation of their identity and bring an approved form of
identification to the local election board within ten days of the
election. 1'
7
Ohio House Bill 3 was challenged on behalf of the Service
Employees International Union ("SEIU") and the Northeast Ohio
Coalition for the Homeless. They argued that counties were violating
constitutional equal protection guarantees by inconsistently applying
the law. 118 The federal court settlement clarified and expanded Ohio's
113 Am. Sub. H.B. 3, 126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3505.18,
3505.181 (West 2007).
114 THE COALITION ON HOMELESSNESS AND HOUSING IN OHIO & THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS OF OHIo, LET THE PEOPLE VOTE, (June 14, 2005) available at
http://www.cohhio.org/alerts/Election%20Reform%20Report.pdf. "Only four fraudulent
votes out of 9 million cast in 2002-2004. The odds are greater to Win the Lottery, Get Struck
by Lightning, than Cast an Ineligible Vote in Ohio."
115 Jim Siegel, People Won't Need ID to Vote Until November, Lawmakers Say, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2006, at 03D, available at http://www.dispatch.com/news-
story.php?story-=dispatch/2006/01/27/20060127-D3-01.html.
116 Am. Sub. H.B. 3.
117 id.
118 Julie Carr Smyth, Voter ID Dispute Settled, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 2, 2006,
http://news.enquirer.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061102/NEWSO /
611020366/1077/COL02.
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new voter-identification standards for Election Day, and suspended ID
requirements altogether for absentee ballots. It added the provisions
that allow voters who do not have identification to use their Social
Security number, which was not permitted as the law was written. In
addition, the list of government documents allowed as proof of ID has
been expanded to specifically include those from local and county
governments, as well as state universities and public community
colleges. 119
B. THE EFFECT OF A VOTER IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT:
ACCESS VS. INTEGRITY
Voter identification laws attempt to strike a balance between
allowing easy access to the electoral system and maintaining the
system's integrity. Proponents of high voter access advocate for less
restrictive voter ID laws to increase voter turnout. Some general
characteristics of a "high access system" include the following: any
eligible voter who submits a properly completed registration form
should not, without good reason, be denied the right to vote; in order
to encourage more Americans to vote, the rules for registering and
voting should be clear and easy to follow; the voter registration form
should be simple and ought to be designed to minimize errors that
could result in a disqualification.12
0
Proponents of the "integrity" side of the argument argue that more
restrictive voter identification laws are necessary in order to curb
potential voter fraud and restore faith in the American voting
systems. 121 Although most proponents of restrictive voter
identification laws consider potential voter fraud to be the primary
reason for identification, most research shows that polling place fraud
12 0 THE CENTURY FOUND., supra note 74.
12 1 For more information concerning voting administration "best practices" for balancing
access and integrity within the electoral system, see NCVI Voting System Recommendations,
Securing the Vote Project: National Committee for Voting Integrity's National Campaign for
Voting System Integrity, http://votingintegrity.org/docs/help/recomend.html (last visited Jan.
26, 2008); Professor Dan Tokaji's "Equal Vote Blog," http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/
tokaji/index.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2008); and PROJECT VOTE, POLICY BRIEF No. 11,
MAINTAINING CURRENT AND ACCURATE VOTER LISTS (2006), available at
http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ProjectVote/PolicyBriefs/List-Maintenance Project-Vote-P
olicyBriefl 1 .pdf.
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is an unfounded concern. 122 In fact, while much of the emphasis on
ballot security and fraud reduction has centered on voter identification,
election officials in many states have said that voting by mail provides
the best opportunity to defraud the election process. This is because
the anonymity and privacy of the ballot-critical ingredients of the
election system's integrity-are most easily compromised when voters
are absent from the polling place.
123
It seems that restrictive voter identification laws, which were the
state trend leading up to the 2006 elections, are an over-inclusive
reaction to the alleged problem of polling place fraud. While REAL
ID may be too over-inclusive to remedy the problem of illegal
immigrant access to state identification cards, even less restrictive
voter identifications laws may hinder civil liberties.
C. THE EFFECT OF A NATIONAL ID CARD ON HELP AMERICAN VOTE
ACT DATABASE MATCHING REQUIREMENTS
By January 1, 2006, all states were required to have databases in
place in compliance with the Help America Vote Act of 2002
("HAVA"). 124  HAVA and the National Voter Registration Act
122 The Election Assistance Commission released its long awaited report on voter fraud and
voter intimidation on Dec. 8, 2006. See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, ELECTION
CRIMES: AN INITIAL REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY (Dec. 2006),
available at http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/docs/reports-and-surveys-
2006electioncrimes.pdf/attachmentdownload/file. The EAC report confirms no systematic
evidence of voter fraud, but also notes the lack of an accepted common definition of the term
"voter fraud." However, the report does takes the important first step of defining "election
crimes," and sets forth the methodology it will use to conduct a study to accurately gauge the
extent to which such crimes take place. Also see commentary of Tova Wang, one of the
consultants to the EAC on the report. She writes: "Over the past month, the silence has been
deafening. For the past few years, many on the Right have been vociferously propagating the
myth that voter fraud at the polling place is a rampant problem of crisis proportions. But we
haven't heard from them lately. In fact, as far as my research can discover (Nexis and Google
news searches of multiple relevant terms), there has not been one confirmed report of any of
these types of incidents in the 2006 election. Not one. Even the Republican National
Committee's vote fraud watch operation in their list of complaints from the 2006 election
could not come up with one such case." Tova Wang, Where's the Voter Fraud?, THE
CENTURY FOUND., Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1452.
123 THE CENTURY FOUND., supra note 74, at 53.
24 See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1712-13 (2002)
available at http://www.fec.gov/hava/lawext.txt.
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("NVRA," also known as the "Motor Voter Act"), 125 require states to
periodically remove ineligible voters from the statewide official voter
list and to develop a statewide voter database that can be verified
against the state's Department of Motor Vehicles database. 126 States
are required to develop standards for implementing a list-maintenance
program that is transparent, consistent, and non-discriminatory.
The rationale behind this new database requirement is to remedy
the lack of clear and specific state criteria for performing list
maintenance. 127 This lack of specific state list maintenance criteria has
resulted in inconsistent standards for federal elections between and
within states. 12 8 Poorly developed and executed matching algorithms
have led to the disenfranchisement of eligible voters in many states. 129
Frequently, the disenfranchisement has a disparate impact on
minorities.130
While HAVA requires some specific functionality with regards to
the voter databases, most of the design and implementation details
have been left to the states. Implementing statewide voter registration
databases could have a number of potential advantages: linking with
correctional databases and courts could facilitate removing and re-
enfranchising felons; linking with social service agencies' databases
could enfranchise people belonging to groups with historically low
participation rates by accurately entering their information into the
registration system and ensuring that it is maintained; linking with
state motor vehicle databases could eliminate duplicate registrations by
accurately purging voters who have left the state, or by quickly
changing registration information for voters who have moved within
the state; and linking with databases in health and vital statistics
departments could ensure that deceased voters are deleted from the
rolls promptly, further reducing the risk of fraud. Finally, having an
up-to-date voter list could reduce the number of eligible voters whose
125 See National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ("Motor Voter Act"), Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107
Stat. 77 (1993).
126 Help America Vote Act.
127 id.
121 See NCVI Voting System Recommendations, supra note 121.
129 id.
130 Id.
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names are not in the poll book, diminishing the need for what should
be the option of last resort, the provisional ballot. 131
Recommendations from private election administration policy
groups provide some guidance as to how states should comply with the
new HAVA database requirements. According to these groups, states
should take all appropriate measures to protect the privacy rights of
voters when constructing and utilizing the statewide voter registration
database, including the creation of an exclusive list of who has access
to voter information and what voter information can be made public or
can be exchanged between state agencies. 1
32
At a minimum, databases should be connected interactively with
the Department of Motor Vehicles, the courts, the Department of
Corrections, and the state's Department of Vital Statistics.
133
Optimally, databases should be connected interactively with as many
state agencies as possible to ensure the timely and accurate updating of
voter information and the most accurate matching and verification of
voter registration information. 134  All voters who provide a DMV
identification number or the last four digits of their Social Security
number on their voter registration form, including first-time voters
registering by mail, should be exempt from HAVA's identification
requirements if the state can verify their information within an existing
state database.' 3
5
When the computer verification process finds records that match
some but not all of a voter's information, these "near matches" should
be audited for transposed characters, inverted names, or other frequent
erors.136 States should adopt a "substantial match" standard that
applies to those applicants whose records match significantly, but not
perfectly, with other state databases.' 37 In addition, States should
explore opportunities for interstate compatibility of their database
software and communication systems to allow for future expansion. 138
131 THE CENTURY FOUND., supra note 74, at 11.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 id.
135 id.
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US: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
D. CONCERNS OVER COMPLIANCE WITH HAVA AND REAL ID
DATABASE REQUIREMENTS
As mentioned previously, following the passage of the REAL ID
Act, states expressed concern regarding the application of the Drivers
Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA") 139 to the records retention and
information sharing requirements of REAL ID. 140  The DPPA is a
federal law that regulates how DMVs release and share information
contained in driver license records. DPPA forbids states from
distributing personal information to direct marketers, but allows
personal information to be shared with law enforcement officials,
courts, government agencies, private investigators, insurance
underwriters, and similar businesses. 141
The National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL")
recommends that the federal government reconcile the new
requirements of REAL ID with the existing Driver Privacy Protection
Act to reflect the DMVs' new responsibilities and advances in
technology since the DPPA was passed. For example, the NCSL
recommended that states should not be required to capture documents
presented by an applicant to verify the address of the driver's principal
residence. 1 2
The possibility for fraud and privacy violations could increase due
to HAVA's requirement that vast amounts of voter information be
stored and matched against state DMV records. When considered in
combination with the REAL ID Act requirement that state DMV lists
must link together to create a national DV list, there seems to be
some serious privacy concerns regarding the establishment of a
"national citizen database."
139 See Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (codified as amended by
Pub. L. No. 106-69 at 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006)). The DPPA prohibits the release or use by
any State DMV (or any officer, employee, or contractor thereof) of personal information about
an individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record. It sets
penalties for violations and makes violators liable on a civil action to the individual to whom
the released information pertains. The latest amendment to the DPPA requires states to get
permission from individuals before their personal motor vehicle record may be sold or
released to third-party marketers.
140 NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, supra note 7, at 15.
141 Drivers Privacy Protection Act.
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One such concern about linking so many major government
databases that contain private information is that it will make the
system as a whole much more vulnerable to security threats and risks;
if one database is targeted, all of the connected databases will be
exposed to the same threat. 143  Since HAVA has no provisions
regarding database access, voting rights groups also worry that states
will sell voter registration information, especially phone numbers, to
political parties and telemarketers.
According to a 2002 study conducted by the nonpartisan California
Voter Foundation, twenty-two states have no restrictions on access to
voter lists. 144 In addition, a number of states have hired outside
contractors to build their database systems, provoking objections from
voting rights groups concerning voter information being accessible to
private companies. 145 Twenty-eight states have contracted with
private companies to develop their voter registration databases, twenty
states are developing or have developed their voter databases in-house,
using state staff and technology, and two states are still in the process
of establishing their database development plans. 146
V. CONCLUSION
With the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and numerous state
laws codifying voter identification requirements, the nation appears to
move ever closer to a national identification system. Embedding
RFIDs in now-mandatory state driver licenses and using Social
Security numbers as unique identifiers in voter databases raise many
new privacy concerns. If DMV, voting, and Social Security records
are kept in a national database, the possibility for abuse grows
exponentially. Do assertions of stronger national security outweigh
privacy concerns and the loss of civil liberties? The tension between
these important issues has been long recognized by the Constitution. In
the wake of heightened security awareness, it is important not to lose
sight of Congress' duty under the Constitution to protect our civil
liberties and right to privacy.
143 Reform Elections.org, Issues - Databases: Questions and Answers,
http://www.reformelections.org/feature.asp?menuid=%7B82E3F571-83A3-4C99-849A-
336A23F76FD1%7D (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
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